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Of Constitutional Amendments, Human Rights, and
Same-Sex Marriages
M IsabelMedina*
Let me not to the marriageof true minds
Admit impediments.
-W. Shakespeare, Sonnet 116
Marriage is the legal recognition of human intimacy; it has
endured throughout the ages. It has undergone a myriad of changes
since the framing of the republic, and it has emerged, in modem
times, as the basis for the family unit.1 Marriage can protect and
secure the values ofcommunity, autonomy, and sexual and emotional
intimacy, for the individuals who choose to enter into it. 2 Many
individuals prefer to raise children within the institution ofmarriage.
Marriage, at times, has served to institutionalize and perpetuate
gender bias in the legal system and in society.' It has also served to
protect or shield abusers and wrong-doers from the reach of the law.4
Traditionally, civil marriage has been viewed as a relationship
involving a man and a woman.5 Changing mores and attitudes,
however, challenge that traditional understanding ofmarriage. These
changes led the Massachusetts Supreme Court to hold in Goodridge
v. Departmentof PublicHealth that Massachusetts could not deny
Copyright 2004, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
Ferris Family Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans, School
of Law. Parts ofthis essay were presented at a symposium on MarriageLaws. The
Effects ofRecentJudicialInterventionRegardingLiberty and MaritalLegislation
at Tulane University School ofLaw on January 30,2004, organized by the LSU and
Tulane Chapters ofthe Federalist Society.
1. See generally, The Michigan Journalof Gender and Law Presents a
Symposium: MarriageLaw: Obsoleteor CuttingEdge?, 10 Mich. J.Gender & L.
21 (2003). This essay addresses only civil marriage, not marriage as defined or
constructed by religious institutions.
2. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, PropertiesofMarriage,104 Colum.
L. Rev. 75, 81-89 (2004) (describing marriage as an egalitarian liberal community).
3. Id. at 91-95. See Naomi R. Calm, The MoralComplexitiesofFamily Law,
50 Stan. L. Rev. 225, 246-47 (1997). See also John G. Culhane, Uprootingthe
Arguments Against Same-Sex Marriage,20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1119, 1189 (1999).
4. See Michelle J. Anderson, MaritalImmunity, IntimateRelationships, and
ImproperInferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates,54 Hastings L.J.
1465 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947 (2002). But see
*

Jennifer Wriggins, MarriageLaw andFamilyLaw: Autonomy, Interdependence,

and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 265, 303 (2000) (arguing that
same-sex marriage would extend the protections now accorded domestic violence
victims to same-sex couples).
5. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,953 (2003).
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"the protections, benefits, and obligations conferred by civil
' 6 marriage
to two individuals of the same sex who wish to manry. ,
Goodridgewas preceded by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 7 which held that there is a realm of
personal sexual intimacy and privacy protected from intrusion by the
state such that the state may not criminalize adult consensual sexual
intimacy and conduct within the home.8 The Lawrence opinion
appeared to recognize its relevance to the issue ofsame-sex marriage;
language in the opinion indicates, however, that, for some justices,
marriage may be sufficiently distinguished from sexual intimacy in
the home to allow states to prohibit same-sex couples from
participating in the institution of marriage.9
Our society has recognized that individual human beings are
entitled to the protection of the law in the establishment of an
enduring and recognized intimate sexual, mental, and emotional
Lawrence
relationship that constitutes that individual's family.'
recognizes that the desire for and right to form an intimate
relationship is not determined by one's sexual orientation."
Recognition of same-sex marriage requires no change to the
substance of the marriage relationship; it merely requires that we
shed the perspectives of entrenched gender roles for both men and
women. Notwithstanding a constitutional command that government
regulate human beings of both sexes as individuals and not on the
basis of gender group norms or stereotypes,' 2 the struggle to ensure
6. Id. at 948.
7. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
8. Id. at 2478, 2484 ("It [the case] does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter."), 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("That this law as applied to private,
consensual conduct is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause does not
mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would
similarly fail under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate state
interest here, such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of
marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations - the asserted state
interest in this case - other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage
beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.").
9. Id. at 2478, 2484.
10. Id. at 2478,2484; Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Penn. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Michael M. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct.
2333 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
43 S.Ct. 625 (1923).
11. 123 S.Ct. 2472.
12. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996). See
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971-72 (2003) (Greaney, J.,
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that individuals will not be penalized for exhibiting behavior,
conduct, or attributes associated with a different gender continues to
pose a substantial challenge to our society.
The Federal Constitution emerged in the twentieth century as the
guarantor of basic human rights. It should not be used, as it was in
1791, to perpetuate tyranny and deny certain human beings the
exercise of basic human rights. 3 Whether viewed as preservation of
a basic human right to pursue happiness through marriage or to be
free from societal animus because of one's sexual orientation, it is
difficult to justify prohibitions against same-sex marriage. Same-sex
marriages involve protected conduct, a highly valued institution and
relationships that cause no harm or injury to individuals or society at
large. 14
I. OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

The amendment process is a critical aspect of our constitutional
framework. Its importance lies in providing a mechanism through
which generations can continue to determine or test the legitimacy of
our government, its protection of basic human rights and its
continued viability for present times. Its importance also lies in
providing a check to judicial review and the role that federal courts
play in our constitutional scheme. 5 The amendment process is a
response to concerns that our human rights and legal norms are
determined by an entity that is not politically accountable, and that
this entity, populated by persons immunized from direct political
accountability, has the power to overrule and declare null and void
actions of the two elected branches.
Amendments are, in most cases, not necessary to secure
16
continued governmental legitimacy or to effectuate change.
Judicial review exercised in constitutional interpretation mirrors the
common law in its flexibility and adaptation to change. The Court's
development of constitutional norms on race discrimination, 7
concurring).
13. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
14. See John Garvey, Men Only, in Morality, Harm and the Law 123-33
(Gerald Dworkin ed., 1994).
15. Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 72-75 (4th ed. 2001).
16. SeeTheodore C. Sorensen, IsaacMarksMemorialLecture: The American
Constitution: Basic Charteror FirstDraftl40 Ariz. L. Rev. 709 (1998); David
A. Strauss, Commentary: The Irrelevanceof ConstitutionalAmendments, 114
Harv. L. Rev. 1457 (2001).
17. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Regents ofthe
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978); Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954); Korematsu v.
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reproductive rights, 8 the death penalty, 9 and civil or criminal
detention of persons 20 are clear examples of this flexibility and
ongoing dialogue between Congress, the Executive and the Court.
The power of judicial review has proved itself remarkably apt at
accommodating constitutional change and modification of legal
norms.
Moreover, it is impossible to divorce the interaction ofjudicial
review, legislative enactments and executive initiatives in reflecting
change in American society. One example is the development of a
constitutional norm on sex discrimination. Passage of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,21 prohibiting discrimination in
employment on the basis of the sex, preceded the Supreme Court's
own adoption of a constitutional norm prohibiting such
discrimination unless it was substantially related to accomplish an
important, exceedingly persuasive, governmental interest.22
Amendments that deprive individuals of human rights or affect
their entitlement to individual rights are problematic. The essence of
the Constitution was to establish the new republic as a government
that would not trammel individual rights. In explaining and
defending the constitutional framework, the framers of the
Constitution consistently identified prevention of tyranny as the
central aim of the drafters. 23 The inherent inconsistency in creating
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896).
18. CompareRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) with Planned
ParenthoodofSoutheasternPenn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(narrowly construing the Roe v. Wade right).
19. CompareAtkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002) (death
sentence is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
when imposed on the mentally retarded) with Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109
S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (imposition of death sentence on mentally retarded held not to
violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments).
20. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003); Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S. Ct. 2095
(1987); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S. Ct. 625
(1953); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525 (1952).
21. Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2000). See
also Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (d) (2000) andTitle IX, Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
22. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
23. The Federalist Nos. 47, 51 (James Madison). See N. Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 82 n. 33, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2877 n. 33
(1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121, 96 S. Ct. 612, 683 (1976); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293, 47 S. Ct. 21 (1936) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56, 87, 52 S. Ct. 285, 294, 306 (Brandeis, J.)
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a nation that would not tolerate tyranny at the hands of a national
government, but would defer to such tyranny as condoned by state
governments, was resolved in the aftermath of the Civil War with
passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.24
The Reconstruction Amendments were adopted to rectify the
compromise on race and slavery reflected in the original Constitution
and to formally reject the Supreme Court's Dred Scott v. Sanford
decision interpreting the Constitution to deprive Congress of power
to grant citizenship to slaves. 25 Those Amendments make it clear
that the amendment process itself is essential to the Constitution's
continued legitimacy. This second revolution established that the
Constitution ensured that individuals were not to be subject to
tyrannical rule or to deprivations of basic human rights at the hands
of the states. It was not until the latter half of the twentieth century,
however, that the Reconstruction Amendments' promise, to secure
basic human rights to all persons in the United States, was realized,
however imperfectly.26 The nation's discourse on just what those
basic human rights are and should be continues today.
It is possible to argue that amendments are, more than anything,
a formal process, since their substance is subject to interpretation by
the Supreme Court. An example ofthis phenomenon is the Court's
treatment of section five of the Fourteenth Amendment as compared
to its treatment of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause.27
But constitutional amendments have accomplished real substantive
change in our society even if it was some time after their adoption
that change was realized. Perhaps the most important role for the
amendment process in American society today, thus, is that it
stimulates continued debate and discourse on issues which are
controversial and about which there is substantial dissent within the
body politic. The wealth of amendments that have been introduced
since the founding of the republic is testimony to the role of the
constitutional amendment process in fostering and encouraging active
(1932); Louis L. Jaffe, JudicialReview: ConstitutionalandJurisdictionalFact,70
Harv. L. Rev. 953, 975 (1957); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the
AdministrativeState, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 1044 (1984).
24. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, amend. XIV, amend. XV.
25. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
26. See e.g., Brown v. Board ofEducation of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct.
686 (1954); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
27. Comparethe SlaughterhouseCases,83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1883), UnitedStates v. Harris,106 U.S. 629,
1 S. Ct. 601 (1882), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S. Ct. 1740
(2000) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615
(1937), and Wickardv. Filburn,317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942).
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citizen participation in political, legal and governmental processes.
Amendments have been proposed on child labor,28 abortion,29 the
rights of crime victims,30 school prayer,31 flag burning,32 the line-item
veto,33 a balanced budget,34 and campaign reform." None, including
the Equal Rights Amendment, have been successful.36 These efforts
may be viewed as part of the ongoing national political and public
debate on issues of public concern.
Most initiatives to amend the Constitution have failed in large
part because of the absence of widespread support or consensus on
the issues, or due to the flexibility of our other institutions. For
example, the Supreme Court may often accommodate sufficient
change to satisfy enough members of the body politic to thwart
adoption of a constitutional amendment. This may explain, perhaps,
the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment.37 The process requires
that a substantial majority ofthe population support the amendment
before it becomes the law for all. The process provided in Article V
begins when two-thirds ofboth Houses propose an amendment or the
legislatures or conventions of two-thirds of the states call for a
constitutional convention. Adoption requires ratification by threefourths of the states. We are a large and very diverse nation; more so
now than at the framing. We, unlike most other countries in the
world, have embraced and thrived on that diversity.38 To embrace
and accept that diversity has required that we develop openness and
tolerance of difference as a national value. It makes great practical
sense to make our national constitutional amendment process
28. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S. Ct. 972 (1939). See Bruce
Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 Yale L.J. 453, 494 n.
8687 (1989).
29. 147 Cong. Rec. S686 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2001).
30. The Victims' Bill of Rights, S.J. Res. 52 and H.J. Res. 174, 104th Cong.
(Apr. 22, 1996) (introduced by Senators Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Dianne Feinstein (DCA) and Cong. Henry Hyde (R-IL)).
31. 143 Cong. Rec. E271 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1997).
32. 147 Cong. Rec. H4043 (daily ed. Jul. 7, 2001).
33. 145 Cong. Rec. E265 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1999).
34. 148 Cong. Rec. H2145 (daily ed. May 7, 2002); 147 Cong. Rec. S3704
(daily ed. April 6, 2001).
35. 147 Cong. Rec. S2853 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2001).
36. 148 Cong. Rec. E2044 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002) (calling for passage of the
ERA); H. Res. 26, 105th Cong. (Jan. 14,1997). See e.g., Allison L. Held et al., The
Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly
Before the States, 3 Win. & Mary J. Women & L. 113 (1997) and Barbara Brown
et al., The EqualRights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasisfor Equal Rightsfor
Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871 (1971).
37. Id.
38. Peter H. Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe
Distance3-15 (2003).
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difficult to accomplish, and that it require overwhelming support by
the body politic, in order for all, even dissenting minorities, to be
bound by it.
Even constitutional amendments may be revisited.
The
Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited sale, manufacture and
transportation of "intoxicating liquors," was adopted in 1919 and
repealed less than fourteen years later in 1933 by the Twenty-First
Amendment. The Eighteenth Amendment constitutionalized a norm
that although perhaps of benefit to society as a whole restricted as a
practical matter, an individual's autonomy and integrity. This type
ofconstitutional norm is common in twentieth century constitutions;
it is alien to the American Constitution, however, and contravenes the
very essence of the constitutional framework.
The Supreme Court has plainly indicated that there is a
constitutional limit to the discrimination and burdens American
governments may place on those who are of a different sexual
orientation from that of the majority, 9 and on the sexual and
relational intimacy that consenting adults enjoy in the privacy of their1
homes. '0 Currently, thirty-six states prohibit same-sex marriage. 4
Other states, however, have recognized civil unions.42 Some
religions, faiths and churches have recognized or "blessed" same-sex
marriages or unions. It seems unlikely, in this climate, that a
constitutional amendment would succeed.
II. OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGES

Marriage is an institution highly valued in American society.
That many individuals choose to establish intimate relationships or
bear children outside marriage does not render marriage irrelevant,
meaningless or valueless. For many individuals in our society civil
marriage remains the preferred mechanism to establish intimacy and
bear and raise children. Historically, marriage as an institution has
served a number ofdifferent functions, including, but not limited to,
providing beneficial conditions for the reproduction of the species.
39. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
40. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
41. See Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 990,
citingP. Greenberg, State Laws Affecting Lesbians and Gays, National Conference
of State Legislatures Legisbriefs at I (April/May 2001) (reporting that, as of May,
2001, thirty-six States had enacted "defense of marriage" statutes).
42. See e.g., An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 2000 Vermont Statutes No. 91
(Apr. 26, 2000).
43. I have explored marriage in a different context previously. See Maria
Isabel Medina, The CriminalizationofImmigrationLaw: Employer Sanctionsand
MarriageFraud,5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 669, 710-17 (1997).
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Traditionally, marriage has been regulated by state law." State law
focuses on the formalities ofthe marriage and leaves its substance to
the parties.45 Formal or statutory marriages generally require only
that parties obtain a license prior to marriage; that parties be married
by an authorized priest, rabbi or other religious, judicial or civil
officer; and, in some states, that parties undergo testing for sexually
transmitted diseases.46 Only upon dissolution of the marriage, when
disputes arise over children ofthe marriage and over what is owed by
one party to another, does the law inquire as to the substance of the
marriage relationship.47 Persons who enter into a valid marriage
under state law owe each other a duty of support enforceable in most
states upon separation or divorce.48 Moreover, even at this stage of
the marriage the parties may resolve all their disputes without
recourse to the court, except for the formality of obtaining the
divorce decree and memorializing, through the court, whatever
agreement has been achieved.
A number of benefits are available to persons who enter into a
marriage relationship; 49 entitlement to those benefits does not depend
on whether the parties observe or live within societal expectations of
what the "ideal" American marriage is supposed to be. To an extent,
the state's willingness to minimize regulation of the substance of
marriage has been shaped by American constitutional law. The
Supreme Court has recognized a core area ofmarital intimacy that is
accorded constitutional protection from governmental intrusion."
44. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 566, 265 S. Ct. 525, 526 (1906)
(issues of fraud in contracting a marriage are solely matters of state cognizance).
45. Maynardv. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723 (1888). See Lynn A. Baker,
Promulgatingthe MarriageContract,23 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 217, 251-53. But
see La. R. S. 9:272-275.1, 307-309 (2000) (establishing an alternative form of
marriage available to couples in Louisiana on a voluntary basis but regulating
marriage upon the desire of the individuals to end the marriage). See Katherine
Shaw Spaht, What's Become of LouisianaCovenant MarriageThrough the Eyes
ofSocialScientists, 47 Loy. L. Rev. 709 (2001). But see Jeanne Louise Carriere,
"It'sDeja Vu All OverAgain:" The CovenantMarriageAct in PopularCultural
Perception and Legal Reality, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1701 (1998). Few couples have
chosen to enter a covenant marriage.
46. See John DeWitt Gregory, et al., Understanding Family Law 26-27 (2d ed.
1993).
47. Baker, supra note 45, at 253-54.
48. Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law ofDomestic Relations in the United States
§§ 6.land 6.4 (2d ed. 1988).
49. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d at 954-57
(describing the tangible and intangible benefits of marriage).
50. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (striking down a state requirement that wives notify husbands
prior to undergoing an abortion); Michael M. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct.
2333 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673 (1978); Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland, 431
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The recognition that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual ... to marry, establish a home and

emerged in constitutional jurisprudence
bring up children .51
during the Lochner era.52 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme
Court struck down a state statute that mandated sterilization ofrepeat
offenders convicted of certain offenses. 3 The Court struck the
statute down as inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminated against a particular
group ofoffenders, indistinguishable from other groups, on the basis
of what the Court called one of "the basic civil rights ofman." 54 The
Court went on to recognize that "[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."55
More than twenty years later, in 1966, the Court struck down a
state statute that prohibited the use of contraceptives. 6 The Court
recognized a right by married couples to privacy in the conduct of
their relationship." This privacy right protected their right to use
contraceptives. The Court referred to marriage as an institution
predating the Bill of Rights.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights--older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.58
While Skinner connects the right to marry with the right to
procreate, Griswold v. Connecticut implicitly recognizes that
U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817
(1967) (state miscegenation statute held unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965); Skinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct.
1110 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923). See also
Bruce C. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus of Marriage,Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy-BalancingtheIndividualandSocialInterests,81 Mich. L. Rev. 463,487,
559 (1983).
51. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S. Ct. 625, 626 (1923).
52. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905).
53. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942).
54. Id. at 541, 62 S. Ct. at 1113.
55. Id., 62 S. Ct. at 1113.
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
57. Id. at 485-86, 85 S. Ct. at 1682.
58. Id. at 486, 85 S. Ct. at 1682.
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marriage involves an intimate sexual relationship between two adults
that does not necessarily have procreation as its primary goal. The
intimate sexual association may lead to procreation, but marriage
itself exists without procreation.
Two years later, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court struck down a
state statute that prohibited marriage between persons of the white
race and persons of other races.59 The Court's finding of
unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment rested on the racial classifications created b7
the state for the purpose ofpreserving the "purity" ofthe white race. °
The Court also ruled that the ban on interracial marriages was
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because "[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.""
Griswold and Loving
established that state regulation of marriage is limited by the
Fourteenth Amendment.62
A decade later, Zablocki v. Redhai 63 reflected the Court's
strongest articulation of the right to marry. The Court held that a
state statute prohibiting persons with outstanding child support
obligations from marrying without first obtaining a judicial
determination that they had paid their outstanding child support
64
violated the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court reasoned that the regulation substantially interfered with
a person's right to marry. Those who could not pay the support
obligations "are absolutelyprevented from getting married. ' 65 Others
may "be coerced into forgoing their right to marry. And even those
who can be persuaded to meet the statute's requirements suffer a
serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an area in which we
have held such freedom to be fundamental. 66 Although "reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter
into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed,, 67
59. 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967).
60. Id. at 12, 87 S. Ct. at 1018.
61. Id., 87 S. Ct. at 1018 ("The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.").
62. Id. at 7, 87 S. Ct. at 1015.
63. 434 U.S. 374, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978).
64. Id. at 382, 98 S. Ct. at 679. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct.
2254 (1987) and Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S. Ct. 1932
(1977).
65. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387, 98 S. Ct. at 681.
66. Id., 98 S. Ct. at 681.
67. Id., 98 S. Ct. at 681.
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conditioning an individual's marriage on satisfaction of any
outstanding child support obligations imposed too great a burden on
the right to marry.
All ofthese cases involved marriage between awoman and a man
and they may be distinguished on this ground. Such a distinction
however, ignores the substance ofwhat a right to marry protects-the
right to establish a family with another consenting adult.
Recognizing the right to marry as a basic and fundamental human
right has not prevented substantial governmental interference or
regulation of that right. In no other context is this as clear as in
marriages between United States citizens and nationals from other
countries. Our constitutional understanding of the right to marry has
tolerated the government's power to prohibit an alien spouse from
residing in the United States with her or his United States citizen
spouse without the government having to specify the reasons for the
prohibition and without the government according the United States
citizen spouse procedural due process rights.68 Moreover, American
immigration law requires substantial interference with the privacy
and intimacy ofmarried couples seeking to establish residence in the
United States if one ofthe spouses is a foreign national.69
Immigration cases posed the same-sex marriage issue as early as
the 1980's.70 While immigration into the United States is limited,
immigration laws exempt spouses ofUnited States citizens from any
numerical immigration limits. 71 Immigration laws also grant
preference to spouses of immigrants. Thus, marriage is one way in
which persons may immigrate to the United States. In Adams v.
Howerton,7 2 a United States citizen filed a petition for his spouse to
be admitted to the United States as an immigrant on the basis of a
same-sex marriage. The marriage had been celebrated in Boulder,
Colorado.73 Immigration authorities denied the petition. The denial
ofthe marital immigration benefit to same-sex couples was affirmed
by federal courts, in part, on the reasoning that federal authority over
who enters the United States is plenary. Moreover, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress had
not intended to include same-sex couples within the marriage
68. United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct. 309
(1950). See also Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, 338 U.S. 537, 547, 70 S.
Ct. 309, 315, ("Although five minutes of cross-examination could enable the
soldier-husband to dissipate seemingly convincing information affecting the
security danger of his wife, that opportunity need not be accorded.") and Justice
Jackson's dissent, 338 U.S. 537, 550, 70 S. Ct. 309,316.
69. See Medina, supra note 43, at 696-717.
70. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (a) and(b) (2003).
72. 673 F.2d 1036.
73. Id. at 1038.
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benefit.7 4 At the time, immigration statutes excluded homosexuals
from qualfying as immigrants. 7 ' Federal courts also have taken the
view that denying entry to a spouse does not burden the right to
marry, because the individuals are not denied the opportunity to enter
into the marriage or to live together; they simply may not live
together in the United States.76
Notwithstanding the immigration cases, the Court's cases on the
right to marry, Loving and Zablocki, in particular, recognize that the
institution of marriage, albeit a legal institution formally created by
the state, shields a core fundamental right or interest secured under
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment with which states may not interfere. Marriage laws that
prohibit individuals from entering into the institution of marriage
with other individuals ofthe same sex operate the severest burden on
the right of marriage, for those individuals who would contemplate
marriage only with individuals of their same sex. If the state
provides an alternative institution, such as a civil union, and accords
persons who enter into civil unions the same protections and benefits
accorded under civil marriage, it is possible to argue that the burden
on the right to marry is minimal.77 But the question ofstigma and the
ugly specter ofseparate but equal rear their heads. The echoes ofand
parallels to interracial marriages in Loving is uncomfortably apt.7"
III. ANIMUS OR REASONABLE REGULATION?

Our national dialogue on same-sex marriage reflects one of
humanity's basic and inherent weaknesses-our inability to
effectively communicate. 9 There is a difference in perspective
74. Id. at 1040 ("The term 'marriage' ordinarily contemplates a relationship
between a man and a woman." (citing Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary and
Black's Law Dictionary)).
75. See Robert J. Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New
Possibilitiesfor Gay and Lesbian Immigration, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 439
(1994).

76.

United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct. 309

(1950). See also Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130 (2nd Cir. 1990); Escobar v.
INS, 896 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2nd 1023 (2nd Cir.
1975); Barmo v. Reno, 899 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
77. But see Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus
Opposite-Sex, UnmarriedCouplesin Domestic PartnershipLaws andOrdinances,
2001 BYU L. Rev. 1023 (2001).

78. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472,2482. See also id.at 2486 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Moral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the
Equal Protection Clause... to justify a law that discriminates among groups of
persons.").
79. See e.g., Marriage and Same-Sex Unions: A Debate (Lynn D. Wardle, et
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among speakers, and the difference appears too vast to transcend. 0
Commentators look at the same evidence and come away with
different conclusions."
Several possible avenues of addressing human rights and samesex marriage present themselves. One is to allow the issue to benefit
from federalism, and allow each state to decide for itselfwhether or
82
not to define marriage so as not to exclude gay and lesbian couples.
This is the current posture and one that may be left in place even if
the issue reaches the Supreme Court, should the Court find that
neither due process nor equal protection prevent the states from
banning same-sex marriage. Proponents ofthe benefits offederalism
should favor this approach as it would appear to be consistent with all
of the articulated benefits of a federalist model.8 3 Other avenues
involve adoption of a national norm, either through adoption of a
constitutional amendment, or a Supreme Court ruling. The substance
of such a national norm, of course, is precisely the question our
society faces today. For the reasons articulated in this essay, it seems
unlikely that a constitutional amendment either prohibiting or
authorizing same-sex marriages would be adopted. Whether the
United States Supreme Court would interpret the federal constitution
to prevent states from banning same-sex marriage, because such a
ban rests on animus towards homosexuals and lesbians and
impermissibly burdens the exercise of their basic human rights
remains to be seen.
Justice O'Connor notes, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence,
that "other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage

al., eds., 2003); Mark Strasser, On Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and the Rule
of Law: Constitutional Interpretations at the Crossroads (2002).
80. Justice Scalia describes this as a war between cultures. Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 652, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See e.g., Maggie Gallagher, A Reality Waiting to Happen: A Response to
Evan Wolfson and Normal Marriage: Two Views, in Marriage and Same-Sex
Unions 10-24 (Lynn D. Wardle, et al., eds., 2003); Evan Woolfson, All Together
Now and Enough Marriage to Share: A Response to Maggie Gallagher, in
Marriage and Same-Sex Unions 3-9, 25-32 (Lynn D. Wardle, et al., eds., 2003).
82. Louisiana, for example, changed its statutory definition ofmarriage in 1987
to exclude same-sex marriage by defining marriage as "the legal relationship
between a man and a woman that is created by civil contract." La. Civ. Code art.
86. 1987 La. Acts, No. 886, § 1(effective Jan. 1, 1988). In 1999, Louisiana further
provided that "marriage between persons of the same sex violates a strong public
policy of the state of Louisiana and such a marriage contracted in another state shall
not be recognized in this state for any purpose, including the assertion ofany right
or claim as a result of the purported marriage." La. Civ. Code art. 3520 (amended
by 1999 La. Acts, No. 890). The Louisiana legislature is presently considering
adding a constitutional amendment to further prohibit same-sex marriage.
83. See Stone, supra note 15, at 139-43.
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beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group. 84 Justice
O'Connor does not identify those reasons; nor does she explain how
same-sex marriage is inconsistent with promoting the institution of
marriage. In the view of some commentators, recognition of samesex marriage would serve many of the interests that state legislatures
seek to vitiate through the institution ofmarriage.85 Equal protection
doctrine would require some relationship between the asserted
interest and the stated goal, and the presence of animus or bias
towards the group affected by the restriction, would require, as
Justice O'Connor recognizes in Lawrence, an actual relationship
between the stated goal and the prohibition. The Goodridgeopinions
identify interests that states are likely to assert to justify a ban on
same-sex marriage.
As the majority opinion in Goodridgerecognizes:
Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging
stable relationships over transient ones. It is central to the
way the [state] identifies individuals, provides for the orderly
distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are
cared for and supported whenever possible from private
rather than public funds, and tracks important
epidemiological and demographic data.86
More particularly, states may assert an interest in the following: "(1)
providing a 'favorable setting for procreation;' (2) ensuring the
optimal setting for child rearing... define[d] as 'a two-parent family
with one parent of each sex-'
and (3) preserving scarce State and
'
private financial resources. 81
As the Goodridge court reasoned, and one Goodridge dissent
acknowledged, today "heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and
childcare are not necessarily conjoined."88 Assisted reproduction
technologies and adoption have for some time provided an alternative
to sexual intercourse for reproductive purposes. Moreover, persons
who cannot procreate are not prohibited from marrying. If the state
does not prohibit marriage to persons who cannot procreate, it is
difficult to see how it may justify a prohibition on same-sex
marriages on that basis-except because of animus or bias towards
homosexual and lesbian individuals.
The second interest is directly linked to the first in that both rest
on the premise that only a family unit made up of a man and a
84. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. Mark Strasser, The StateInterests in Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage,in
Marriage and Same-Sex Unions 33-42 (Lynn D. Wardle, et al., eds., 2003).
86. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,954 (2003).
87. Id. at 961.
88. Id. at 995 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
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woman should raise children. 89 The state's interest in protecting
children, however, is not furthered by prohibiting same-sex couples
from marrying. Homosexuals and heterosexuals alike bear and raise
children in the United States today. A prohibition against same-sex
marriage serves not to protect children of same-sex couples, but to
increase their risk. Prohibition of same-sex marriage conveys state
approval of discrimination and animus towards same-sex couples;
this discrimination and animus is directed not just at the adults in the
relationship, but is visited as well upon the children. Moreover, there
is little evidence to establish that children do better in families with
opposite-sex parents. Little research has been done to date, to
establish that opposite-sex parents are any more or less effective than
same-sex parents at child-rearing; the research that has been done is
inconclusive.9" But it is perhaps in the area of child rearing that the
arguments against allowing same-sex marriage are based on harm.
The expert and statistical evidence is inconclusive because either too
little research has been conducted into same-sex families, the
research that has been done has focused on families that have gone
through a divorce, or because the research is disputed.
It is unlikely that scientific research will ever settle the question
of what the best family setting for all children may be. Like most
institutions, the family is a dynamic organism constituted of
individuals who all have varying personalities, needs, wants and who
are in a constant state of change and development. Families are not
static, just as people are not static. What may work best with one
child, may not work with another.
Children are not harmed by same-sex marriage. Children are
harmed by lack of access to health care, lack of a living wage, lack
of access to a good or even adequate education, lack of access to
adequate shelter and food, and a safe and secure environment.
Children are better off with non-abusive homosexual parents than
with abusive heterosexual parents. Indeed, it is difficult for some to
understand why children would be affected at all by their parent's
sexuality, except for the animus that society directs at persons of the
minority sexuality. Moreover, it is difficult to evaluate the claims
about parenting in the context of a debate that purports to be, at one
level, about morality. If children of same-sex couples are harmed, it
will be difficult to establish that the harm is not the result of societal
animus directed at their parents, but a result of the same-sex
parenting itself. This harm is suffered not just by children of same89. Id. State court decisions restricting parental rights when one ofthe parents
is homosexual or lesbian rely on this view of marriage and parenting. See Lofton
v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).

90. See supra note 81.
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sex parents, whether they are couples or not, but by children who are
themselves homosexual or lesbian.
The third interest identified, to conserve economic resources, is
inapposite. Basically, a state asserting this interest is arguing that it
should be able to discriminate against homosexual couples to
conserve resources. But it is difficult to see how the state would be
conserving public and private resources by discriminating against
homosexuals. Those same costs will be incurred, since the
individuals involved, whether adults, parents, or children, will incur
the same medical, educational and employment costs outside of
marriage as well as within the marriage. Marriage, as the Goodridge
court noted, is one way in which states ensure that the costs of caring
for individuals and children are provided for. Same-sex marriage
furthers this interest; it does not hinder it.
IV. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it is hard to argue that opposition to same-sex
marriage is not about animus or moral disapprobation of lesbian and
gay individuals and couples. It is unlikely that allowing same-sex
couples to marry will materially affect the vast number of
heterosexual marriages that are celebrated in this country. Moreover,
recognizing same-sex marriage furthers values of community,
autonomy, equality, stability, and intimacy. There appears to be no
reason to discriminate against same-sex couples other than because
traditionally marriage has been a heterosexual institution. But the
traditional view of homosexuals and lesbians reflects substantial
tolerance for rabid animus, expressed through legal norms and
sometimes, through violent acts, towards gay and lesbian individuals
and the sexual conduct that is at the heart oftheir status.9' Ifthe only
reason to discriminate against same-sex couples with regards to
marriage is because of animus towards them, it is hard to see how
such discrimination or distinctions could survive either equal
protection or due process scrutiny.
Nothing about the institution of marriage is peculiarly
heterosexual-not caring for children, not privacy or intimacy, not
support. Prohibiting persons who are homosexual or lesbian from
enjoying the legal celebration of their marital union, and from
enjoying the "[t]angible and intangible benefits" which flow from
91. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996); Goodridge,798 N.E.2d 941. See stats on violence directed
at gays. See William B. Rubenstein, The RealStory of US. Hate CrimeStatistics:
An EmpiricalAnalysis,78 Tul. L. Rev. 1213, 1230-33 (analyzing statistical data to
establish that "gay people are about two and one-half times more likely to report a
hate-based attack on their selves than are members of other minority groups").
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marriage, furthers no legitimate state goal and burdens one of the
most basic of human rights-the right to establish and enjoy an
intimate relationship--a family-with another adult.

